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Nature and Significance of Bank Liquidity
In the everyday usage of bankers the term"liquidity,"when applied
to bank assets, relates to the possibility ofconverting assets into cash
without serious loss of time or money. When applied to a bank it
refers to the extent, relative to the volume and character of liabili-
ties, to which the bank holds assets that are either in the form of
cash or readily convertible into cash without materialloss.1
In many situations, the cash obtainable from liquid assets is of
secondary importance, as is shown by the fact that a short-term asset
may be bought with the intention of replacing it with another as
soon as it matures, and so on indefinitely. This is typical of bank
loans at the present time. The cash itself is not retained or even
desired; there would be a saving of much effort if a longer-term
security were bought in the first place and possibly a higher return
would be realized in addition. But what is gained - and what
makes the extra trouble and the lower return seem justified - is the
fact that the asset is safeguarded against substantial shrinkage, how-
ever temporary, in its capital value.
In the final analysis, however, the liquidity problem of banks is
primarily and basically the problem of assuring that there will be
an adequate amount of cash on hand, when needed, to meet all
demands for cash. The task of providing sufficient cash presents
itself in two ways: the individual bank, if it is to stay in business,
must be able to meet all demands for cash including those resulting
from the transfer of money to other banks in the system; and banks
as a whole must be able to supply whatever demands are made upon
them for the purpose of drawing money out of the system, whether
abroad or for use in domestic circulation. While a drain of (ash
out of the banking system necessarily involves the withdrawal of
funds from some individual bank or group of banks, a withdrawal
from an individual bank, which may simply represent a transfer of
1Distinctions in terminology and theory bearing on the meaning of liquidity are
elaborated in an appendiX at the end of this section, p. 9 If.
1funds to other banks. does not necessarily involve a withdrawal hOITI
the system. .
The problem of the liquidity of the bankmg systcm as a whole
entails questions iuvolving general governmental and fisral deci-
sions as well as central banking policy and procedure. nllt it is the
liquidity of the individllal bank rather than of the hankin~ s"stelll
that concerns the great majority of hankers most freCJuently ;md
most directly. Even those aspens of the prohlem which ill\ohe
all banks have their foclls in the affairs of the individual !>;mks.
'Vhether a drain of rash is from the banking system as a whole or
only from a single ballk in the system, its imlllediate manifestation
is the withdrawal of deposits from some hauk or grollp of ballks.
Likewise that part of the liqllidity qllestion which relates uot so
milch to providing cash as to arranging the maturity distriblltion of
earniufT assets in sllch a wav as to a"oid IIndlle dellrec:iation. is aiso
~ ,
a subject callillg for decisioll by individual b;mkers.
LIQUIDITY OF THE INDIVIDlTAL BANK
The fUlldamental task confronting any hank is to keep the "allle of
assets eqllal to the vallie of liabilities. The bases of this prohlem
are a reflection of the characteristics of the ballking business. III
contrast with other middlemen, the hanker holds few assets of a
tangible sort; his resomces consist predominantly of the dehts of
businessmen and the government. At the same time he owes "ery
large slims to the pllblic in the form of time and demand deposits.
The demand deposits carry the obligation to pay cash whene"er it
is requested, while on time deposit., a short period of waiting is
allowed by law but is seldom invoked.
The blllk of a bank's liabilities, then, are slIbject to payment on
call, and it is essential that at all times the resources of the hank
provide the means for meeting demands for cash as they afe made.
It might appear that this would require banks to holel against these
liabilities resources which are also payable on raIl. As hankin,~ is
carried on today, an exact balancing of the maturities of assets and
liabilities is not feasible. Fortllnately it is also nor lIecessan·. sime
there is not the slightest likelihood that the depositors' lega'l rights
to early payment will be fully exercised.
While the banking problem nominally emhraces all liabilities. it
is the bank's liabilities to the public rather than to its stockholders
2that constitute the primary consideration. If liabilities in the form
of capital accounts are not covered by assets it is unfortunate for the
stockholders, but that is a normal business hazard attaching to par-
ticipation in any enterprise. If depositors lose, on the other hand,
it is much more serious since this represents the failure of a vital
pan of the monetary mechanism, and may entail indefensible hard-
ships to the bank's customers and impair the efficient working of
the entire economy.
In practice the task of balancing assets and liabilities divides itself
into two parts, the long-run and the immediate. The long-run phase
relates to total assets and liabilities. It is the problem of solvency
in the literal sense of dissolubility, i.e., could the affairs of the hank
he wound up without loss to anyone? The shon-run phase relates
to liquid assets and liabilities, meanin~ hy liquid liabilities those
that are liquid in fact rather than merely in form. This is the prob-
lem of liqliidily, of heinA" able to meet all demands for (ash as they
are presented; it is imponant at all times, since failure to remain
in a position to meet all claims as they are presented leayes the hank
with no alternative but to close its doors. The long-run problem is
of concrete significance only if it is desired to close out the bank.
It is possible for a bank to be temporarily in a position where its
assets at current market valuations fail to cover liabilities. Such a
situation might develop as the result ofa sharp recession in business
activity such as occurred in 1920-21, a drop in price of farm land as
in the twenties or a drastic decline in security price,S such as fol-
lowed the 1929 crash.2 By continuing operations until there is a
recovery in businessconditions. the situation of technical insolvency
may correct itself. Ordinarily the chief importance of the long-run
banking problem is indirect. That is, a satisfactory solution of the
immediate or shon-run banking problem may depend upon a suc-
cessful handling of the long-run problem.
The basis of an attack upon the fundamental banking problem
is suggested by its definition. Since the objective is to keep assets
equal to liabilities, the pwblem may be approached from the side
of assets or of liabilities, or of both assets and liabilities. In the
long run the problem of keeping assets equal to liabilities applies
to all assets and liabilities; in the short run it is a matter of effecting
2The relath-e importallce or loans or securities in the composition of bank port-
folios wOllld help to detelmine which of these hazards was the more serious.a suitable balance between liquid assets and liquid liabilities. The
maintenance at all times of a balance of this short-run character is
the essence of any solution of the liquidity problem.
LACK OF UNIFORMITY AMONG BANKS
For any individual bank the problem of liquidity is of a compound
character. It entails the provision of adequate cash as it is needed,
the spacing of the maturities of income-yielding assets to meet
future demands for cash and the realization of as high a net income
as is consistent with safety. A solution of the problem is rendered
more difficult by the variation that exists among banks.
Some banks are so large that their officers hesitate to rely on sale
of securities as a means of obtaining additional cash for fear this
might jeopardize the stability of the sewrity market. Accordingly
a relatively large portion of assets may he held in the l"orm of cash
and of securities convertible into cash without resort to sale in the
open market. A small bank can plan, to a degree that a large bank
possibly cannot, upon the shifting of assets as a means of obtaining
necessary cash.
Banks differ markedly, also, in the character of their deposit lia-
bilities. A bank with large bankers' balances or with deposits of
large corporations or governmental agencies must be prepared for
pronounced fluctuations in their amount. A bank with a high pro-
portion of time deposits, or a neighborhood type of bank with nu-
merous small demand deposits, will nonnally be subject to little
net change in deposits. Furthermore, the size of deposit accounts
ordinarily bears a direct relation to the susceptibility of deposits to
contraction of the sort that occurs when a bank is in difficulties.
A study ofthe experience ofa group of banks which failed just prior
to the banking holiday of 1933 showed, for example, that deposits
of $25,000 and up decreased 64 percent, and those under $.500 by 6
percent. For deposits under $200 the shrinkage was negligible.
Among different types of depositors the decrease was greatest for
interbank deposits.s
Within a particular city there may be business banks with a rela-
tively small number of accounts of large average size, other banks
primarily engaged in trust operations, and still others with a lar<re
~
3Federal Reserve Bulletin (Ma~rh.]939) pp.. 178.8\. The reduction in size of larger
aocounlS may have helped. by bnngmg them IOto lower size classes. to maintain the
averages of the smaller accounts.
4volume of personal accounts. It is not even possible to generalize
between dty banks and country banks. Two adjoining banks in
thesame town may have distinctly diffeTent types of business. TheTe
are large banks, even in New York City, that are much closer to
what is generally thought of as a country bank than they are to the
conventional pattern of a big city bank.
A bank has to consider not only the normal behavior of its deposit
accounts; it must also take into consideration the pTeferences and
prejudices of its customers. A bank may hold large amounts of cash
and highly liquid assets, not because it has any expectation of need-
ingthem, but merely because it believes that large depositors would
transfer a substantial proportion of their funds elsewhere if it were
to maintain a less liquid policy than other leading banks.4 The
extent to which a bank will be affected by this possibility of transfer
is influenced both by the type of deposits it holds and by the prac-
tices being followed by other banks at the same time. A bank that
has national accounts has more to fear from a loss of deposits than
another whose accounts are locally held. However, any bank has
greater latitude in reducing its own liquidity when other banks are
reducing theirs, for there would be less reason to transfer deposits
on the ground that other banks are more liquid. Moreover, the
fact that the action is general helps to overcome the prejudice
against a particular bank's following such a policy.
The location of a bank may have considerable bearing upon It:>
probable liquidity requirements. A bank in a community experi-
encing a sudden boom may be faced with a drain of funds if the
boom collapses and will, therefore, need to be in a position to pro-
vide cash in larger amounts than a bank in a community where
conditions are more stable. At one time funds may show a tendency
to move toward an industrial or agricultural community, and at
another time or under different conditions they may move toward
a financial community. Conditions may change because of seasonal
orcyclical reasons, a war boom, security or real estate speculation -
because of anything, in fact, that causes business conditions to
behave differently in one part of the country from what they do in
4 Assuming that the hank is lOrrect in this belief. the maintenance of the liquidity
of asseu is a means of rcstricting what has been referred to as the liquidity of lia-
bilitics. In such a situation a change in the liquidity of asseu is inversely related to
the liquidity of liabilities, i.e., the more liquid usets become the less liquid are
liabilities and vice versa.
5another. Minor differences may arise from snch factors as the
strength of its relations with other banks and ,,'.hether.or not it is
near a Federal Reserve Bank. Not all of the regIonal dIfferences in
liquidity requirements can be au:nrately foreseen. In periods of
boom or depressiou, moreover, the sallie forces that confuse the
judgment of other businessmen also assail the bankers, as experience
demonstrated after the last war and dnring the Florida real estate
boom in the middle twenties. Adaptation to regional differeuces
is rendered particularly difficnlt by the fact that the policies of simi·
lar banks in other areas become au entirely untrustworthy gnide.
Differences in policies with regard to liquidity appear to be inHB-
enced in some degree by the earnings position of hanks. The deter-
mination of a bank's portfolio policy requires a balancing of its need
for cash and its need for income: a bauk may fail through either an
o\'erestimate or an underestimate of its future liquidity reqnire-
ments, since the one might lead to inadequate income and the other
to inability to meet its obligations. A hank that anticipates a de-
crease in earuings may, for that reason alone, assume a less liquid
position, while another whose earnings outlook is satisfactory lIlay
remain as liquid as before.
The lack of uniformity in policies followed can be explained onl\
in part by differences in the characteristics of individual banks. To
a considerable extent it is attribntable to the influeuce of strong-
minded bankers, who ha\"e their particular ideas as to how banks
should be run. Few of them stand out as conspicllously as the
famons exponent of liquidity, "tOO-percent" Nichols, head of a
suburban bank in the Chicago area, did a few years a~o, bill it is
safe to S<1.y that scores of bankers have put their indh'idual impres-
sion on their banks as definitely, if less dramatically, as Mr. Nichols
did on his.
There is no precise formula for providing liquidity ofassets. One
bank may hold a large proportion of short-term assets and relati\"eh
small amonnts of cash and long-term securities; and another ma~­
follow the opposite policy, holding a considerable share of its assets
in long-ternl form and relativelv little iu short, reh'ina on larue
I I'::' ~
holdings of cash to provide the reqnisite liqnidity. A great \"ariet\"
of combinations can be, and in faet are, used to gi\"e the desire~l
liquidity and yield. The most nsnal practice, however, is for a bank
























Iand working cash needs. a considerable volume of short-term securi-
ties and mostorall ofthe remainder of its earningassets in mediulll-
term securities with possibly a small quantity of long-term bonds.
Further examples will serve to illustrate the variety of policies
followed by banks:
A Florida bank held approximately equal amounts of
cash and government securities maturing in twenty years
or more and virtually no short-term or mediulll-term as-
sets. The large holdings of cash were relied upon to give
whatever liquidity was required, their high degree of li-
quidity compensating for the limited liquidity of the
long-term securities. At the same time, the higher yield
on these securities was counted on to make up for the
large proportion of assets yielding no income. and to
result in a higher average return than would have been
obtained from following a more conventional portfolio
policy.
In a large city in the east at the end of 1943 one bank
held over 70 percent of its Treasury securities in maturi-
ties of over five years. while another bank held less than
14 percent in maturities of that length. In the same city
ratios of capital funds to total deposits ranged from 4 per-
cent to 120/4 percent.
One bank with large corporate deposits has a Te<:ord ot
the minimum amount ofeach balance priorto the banking
holiday of 1933. On the ground that funds that did not go
out at that time can be counted on to remain, the bank
makes it a policy to cover everything in eXcess of this mini-
mum with highly liquid assets.
Another large bank estimates, largely on the basis of
past experience. the minimum amount to which particu-
lar accounts or groups of accounts may fall in the course of
a year. It computes the sum of these minimum halances
and then follows the practice of covering everything aumoe
this total with highly liquid assets. While admitting that
the shrinkage in balances would not all occur at the same
time, the practice is nevertheless defended on the ground
that this fact provides an added element of safety.
There are four banks of approximately the same size in
7a certain New England city. In June 1943 one of the
banks held Treasury obligations amounting to $514,000
and loans and discounts to $1,793,000 out of total assets of
$3,003,000. Another of the hanks had just the opposite
distribution of assets, with Treasury obligations amount-
ing to $1,392,000 and loans and discounts to $643,000 out
of total assets of $3,716,000. Contrary to what might be
expected, the first bank was a savings bank and trust com-
pany while the other was not.
A bank in a farming community of 2,000 held aggregate
deposits at the end of 1942 amounting to $1,126,000, of
which 86 percent were payable on demand. Assets in·
cluded loans and discounts of $237,000; investments.
chiefly government securities, of $249.000; and cash and
due from other banks. $818,000. In this bank cash, includ-
ing cash items and due from other banks, represented
nearly 73 percent of total deposits. The ratio of cash to
deposits in all country member banks was 32 percent.
In computing liquid assets some banks lump all govern-
ment securities along with cash as liquid assets. Others in-
clude only those with maturities of one year or less as fully
liquid.
The characteristics of the particular bank play an important part
in the requirements and recommendations laid down by officials
charged with the supervision and examination of banks. Under
conditions prevailing today, no bank would be criticized for hav-
ing too many government obligations in its portfolio. Examiners
might suggest, however. that a different selection of maturities
would accord more nearly with the bank's prospective needs. In
determining their liquidity policies, bankers are obliged to assess
the combined importance of such factors as a bank's size, location
and type of business. These factors are likewise among the prin-
cipal considerations upon which bank examiners and supervisory
authorities base their recommendations.
Perhaps the most important single observation that can be made
concerning the problem of liquidity of the individual hank is that
there is no general solution, valid for all banks at any time or for
any bank at all times. Liquidity is essentially an individual affair;
it would be sheerest folly to attempt to set down a concise fonnula
8, that any banker could adopt. Moreover, no banker can count on
assuring liquidity simply by adopting the policies followed by some
other bank inwhich he has confidence. The liquidity problem pre-
sents itself in a wide variety of fonns largely because banks differ so
greatly in their basic characteristics.
APPENDIX
A NOTE ON THE MEANING OF LIQUIDITY
As used in financial discussions, the word "liquidity" is simply a
figure of speech tc which we have become so accustomed that we
forget that it is a figure. By analogy, money is the equivalent of a
liquid. Cash is identified with complete liquidity; degrees of
liquidity ofassets correspond to the extent to which assets approach
equivalence with cash. The test of this equivalence is the certainty
of being able, in case the need arises, to exchange assets for money
without delay and without "material" diminution of the value at
which the assets are carried on the books of the bank. The same
figure of speech is implicit in a number of related expressions, such
as "liquidation," '''frozen credit" and "thawing out of bank loans."
In technical economic literature the term "liquidity" is fre-
quently used in a specialized sense embodying a particular concep-
tion of how banking should be carried on. This usage was em-
ployed by spokesmen for the BankingSchool which played an active
part in monetary controversies a century or more ago. In recent
years it has been reformulated and reemphasized in the writings of
the late Professor H. Parker Willis and his associates at Columbia
University. This usage identifies liquidity with the granting of
credit through the purchase by banks of "self-liquidating commer-
cial paper." By this is meant short-term obligations that originate
in commercial operations whose completion provides the money for
their discharge.
Since 1930 a great deal of discussion has centered about the rela-
tion of liquidity, and more especially "liquidity preference," to
interest theory and the theory ofmoney. Without entering into the
controversy associated with liquidity preference, it is worth reiterat-
ing that the familiar generalization that short-term securities com-
mand a lower rate ofinterest than long-tenn securities does nothold
9true historically. On the basis of data for the first quarter of each
year it appears that from 1900 to 1930 the short-term interest rates
were perceptibly below the long-term rate in only one year.~ At
one time it was argued that the short rate should be higher than the
long rate because investors had to be compensated for the trouble
and expense of reinvesting money put out at shoTt term. This
theory of "illiquidity preference," and perhaps also the idea of
liquidity preference, would seem to be in wnsiderable palt a prod-
uct of the conditions under which they originated. The validity of
either as a uni\'ersal generali7.ation is clearly open to question.
The expression "liquid funds" is used to refer to cash or cash
claims which are available, according to need, for such purposes as
withdrawals of currency by depositors, meeting of increased resene
requirements (whether these arise out of a change in the legal ratio
or a growth in deposit liabilities) and the provision of additional
vault cash. "Liquid assets" is used more broadly to indude high-
grade earning assets of short maturity or assured wnvertibility.
"Liquid bank assets" have been defined by the Federal Reserve
as follows: "From the standpoint ofan individual bank liquid assets
or secondary reserves include balances payable on demand. loans
that may be readily called or sold in the open market withont
invoh-ing customer relations, and securities that may be sold with-
out risk ofmaterial loss of principal. In general, such assets include
most of the following: brokers' loans, bankers' acceptances, open
market wmmercial paper, and short-term high-glade securities. as
well as cash and balances with other banks." 6
Any description of the liquidity of assets must assume some
degree of orderliness in the conditions of liquidation. It is of" little
use to describe the liquid assets of a bank as "only those which can
be convcrted into cash tomorrow morning without having to sus-
tain a loss," or hold that no more of a bank's holdings of honds
should be included as liquid than could he sold without depressing
the market.1
For groups of banks, or even for many large hanks indi\·idually.
so rigid a definition of the liquidity of hank investments is wholly
artificial. It is very much like maintaining that grain dealers should
5 See Davit! Durant!. Ba5;c riehl.! Of Carport/It' Bond.l. 1900-/9J2 (:Xalional Bureau
of I-:(ollomic Research. Technifal Paper 3) pp. 16.19.
6En/nal Rt'un'(': Bullrlin (April 1939) p. 262.
1 Banking (April 1939) p. R3.
10value at the market price only that part of their stock of wheat
whichcould be turned intocash at that price "tomorrow morning."
Any valuation based on market price must inevitably assume the
maintenance of some degree of order in the market, whether that
orderliness results from the elasticity of supply and demand or is
the consequence ofcontrol by the central authorities. The basis of
liquidity in a free market lies largely in the possibility of a transfer
of assets to other investors, total demand for the assets remaining
approximately constant. In a market that is not free it may consist
of the possibility of a transfer to some outside agency such as the
central bank, or it may depend upon restraints on the exercise of
the public's right to demand cash.
To the extent that the liquidity of particular banking assets is
contingent upon their transfer to other banks, the liquidity of
assets for individual banks is greater than for the banking system as
a whole. At the present time the liquidity of bank assets is guaTall-
teed by their shiftability to the Federal Reserve Banks. This mean-
ingof the shiftability of bank assets is altogether different from that
involved in the controversy over liquidity and shiftability before
and after 1920. At that time the term shiftability was generally
assumed to refer to the transfer of assets to commercial banks or
other private investors. Today it is primarily concerned with trans-
fer to the Federal Reserve Banks. As long as the Federal Reserve
continues to provide a market for securities of the types held by
banks, the liquidity of most individual banks and of the system of
banks is assured.
The liquidity of particularassets is affected by the price at which
they are carried on the books of the bank. If, for example, they
were bought at a bargain or have been marked down sufficiently
(as in the case of bank buildings), assets may be said to be liquid
even though the market is very limited and sales would be at a
much lower price than could have been obtained earlier. Thus the'
test of an asset's liquidity might be thought of as consisting, at any
particular moment, of getting back a sum of money equal to the
amount of the liabilities which the asset is calculated as offsetting
on the balance sheet of the bank, or, alternatively, it could be said
that the test of liquidity turns on recovering the money that was
put in. The first of these usages is more pertinent to the problem
of bank liquidity. Partof the value which the asset originally repre-
11sented may have been offset by marking the asset down on the books
of the bank, and the receipts that made this re\'aluation possible
may hare come from general profits rather than fmm the asset itself,
In order, that is, for the asset to have liquidity it is not ncces~ary
to recover by sale in the market the full amouut of money originally
paid for the asset.
8
Need for liquid funds may arise through either expansion or con·
traction of deposit obligations. An expansion of deposit calls for
reserves because of the rise in reserve requirements, and additional
amounts of cash are necessary if the volume of currency in.circula·
tion increases at the same time. A deposit contraction that has the
character of a run, with deposits converted into currency which is
held idle rather than deposited in other banks. creates a need for
more cash: reserves decline by the same amount as deposits, thus
lowering the ratio of reserves to deposits. A deposit contraction
that is the result of repayment of sums borrowed from hanks, on
the other hand, increases the liquidity of banks: the decline ill
deposits lowers the resene requirement withont diminishing the
amount of reserves; indeed banks' holdings of cash reserves may rise
through the deposit of currency withdrawn from circulation.
It is not the total cash payments effected but the net withdrawal
of cash that determines a bank's liquidity requirement. A bank
that is constantly receiving and paying out cash in equal amounts
will obviously have less need for liqnidity than another bank l\'hose
total payments are not currently equalized by receipts. For the indio
vidual bank orfor the system, liquidity requirements depeud on the
"peak load" of net withdrawals over the period for which reserves
are averaged. The great difference between the individnal bank
and the banking system is that a large proportion of the withdraw-
als from particular hanks will be lodged in other banks within the
system, while only a relatively small part of debits to accounts in
any individual bank will ordinarily be redeposited in that same
bank.
There is another fnnction of liquidity that may be more impor.
tant than providing for an actual orpotential need for cash, namely,
to afford protection against a decline in the market value of the
assets held. In the case of earning assets the protection gi\·en is
8This principle is recognized in the procedurc known as "c'"alu;,tioll allow;lI1ccs."
See below, pp. 36·~i.
12closely related to the fact that a liquid security is ordinarily readily
convertible into cash. If it is known that a security can be, or auto-
matically will be, exchanged for a definite sum of money within a
'ihort period of time, its market price cannot decline far below this
amount; and likewise if the price of a security is stable (assuming
that access to the JI)arket is reasonably free) it can be converted into
cash at any time.
The possibility of a greater decline in the market value of senITi-
ties with longer maturities may rest,upon the risk of default or the
risk of a rise in the level of interest rates. For long-term govern-
ment obligations or any other security whose full payment when
due is unquestioned, only the second factor is important. How-
ever, actually realized loss resulting from a decline in market value
caused solely by a rise in interest rates would be avoided if the secu-
rity were held until maturity. Under such circumstances an impair-
ment of the capital value of assets would become effective only if
bankofficers were voluntarily to sell or write down securities accord-
ing to their market price, or were forced to do so by examiners or
other bankingauthorities.
13